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Accounting Conservatism and
Managerial Incentives
Young K. Kwon
School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178900, and
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, y-kwon@uiuc.edu
There are two sources of agency costs under moral hazard: (1) distortions in incentive contracts and (2) imple-mentation of suboptimal decisions. In the accounting literature, the relation between conservative accounting
and agency costs of type (1) has received considerable attention (cf. Watts 2002). However, little appears to be
known about the effects of accounting conservatism on agency costs of type (2) or trade-offs between agency
costs of types (1) and (2). The purpose of this study is to examine this void. In a principal-agent setting in which
the principal motivates the agent to expend effort using accounting earnings, this study shows that accounting
earnings become more useful for reducing agency costs of type (2) when measured conservatively than when
measured aggressively. Combined with the result in Kwon et al. (2001) that agency costs of type (1) decrease
with accounting conservatism, this analysis suggests that conservative accounting enhances the incentive value
of accounting signals with respect to both types of agency costs.
Key words : accounting conservatism; moral hazard; limited liability; agency costs
History : Accepted by Stefan Reichelstein, accounting; received June 17, 2003. This paper was with the author
7 months for 3 revisions.
1. Introduction
The separation of ownership and control in publicly
held ﬁrms often creates incentive conﬂicts between
stockholders and management, which causes agency
costs for the ﬁrms’ stockholders. Two types of agency
costs arise in a standard principal-agent setting:
(1) incentive costs and (2) the costs of implementing
suboptimal decisions. The former refer to the costs
that the principal incurs in motivating the agent to
make desired decisions, and the latter to the princi-
pal’s welfare loss in implementing decisions that are
second best rather than ﬁrst best.1 This study exam-
ines how reported accounting earnings affect agency
costs in publicly held ﬁrms when the earnings are
measured conservatively rather than aggressively.
In the accounting literature, there have been sev-
eral attempts to explain demands for conserva-
tive accounting based on incentive considerations.2
1 The costs of suboptimal risk sharing in Holmstrom (1979) and the
agent’s rents in Mirrlees (1974) are well-known examples of agency
costs of type (1). Agency costs of type (2) include overconsumption
of managerial perquisites in Jensen and Meckling (1976), under-
investment in risky but proﬁtable projects in Lambert (1986), and
escalation errors in Kanodia et al. (1989). It is noted that the two
types of agency costs are inextricably interrelated, and they are
traded off against each other in second-best contracts.
2 In contrast with studies based on incentive considerations, Basu
(1997), Zhang (2000), Penman and Zhang (2002), and Bagnoli and
For instance, Antle and Lambert (1988) demonstrate
that second-best contracts require different penal-
ties for accountants’ reporting errors depending on
whether they are of type 1 or type 2 errors, and
that this asymmetry causes accountants to prefer
conservative accounting practices. Kwon et al. (2001)
analyze conservative accounting as a means to trade-
off between two related and yet distinct agency costs
of type (1): the costs of suboptimal risk sharing and
the agent’s rents. Gigler and Hemmer (2001) explore
the relation between conservative earnings measure-
ments and the costs of inducing truthful management
disclosures. Venugopalan (2004) discusses conditions
under which investment distortions decrease with
conservative accounting. Chen et al. (2004) argue
that accounting conservatism reduces management’s
incentives to overstate reported earnings.
While insightful, these studies are based on the
simplifying assumption that the agent’s decisions are
exogenous. Thus they focus on the effect of conser-
vative accounting on agency costs of type (1). As a
result, they provide little insight regarding the effects
of accounting conservatism on agency costs of type (2)
or trade-offs between agency costs of types (1) and (2).
Watts (2005) investigate empirically the demands for conservative
accounting on the basis of stock market reactions. For an extensive
survey, see Watts (2002).
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This study contributes to ﬁlling this void. The analy-
sis is based on a principal-agent model in which the
principal motivates the agent to expend effort based
on reported accounting earnings. An important fea-
ture is that the agent’s effort level is endogenously
determined, rather than exogenously given.3
The main result of the analysis is that accounting
earnings are more useful for controlling the cost of
suboptimal managerial decisions when earnings are
measured conservatively as opposed to when they
are measured neutrally or liberally. This study differs
from Kwon et al. (2001), which examines the princi-
pal’s trade-off between the costs of suboptimal risk
sharing and the agent’s rents. In contrast, this study
focuses on how the principal trades off the agent’s
effort against the agent’s rents. In the model, the prin-
cipal can induce the agent to expend greater effort by
increasing the spread between the agent’s rewards for
a favorable performance and penalties for an unfavor-
able performance. However, such an increased spread
in the agent’s fee structure is costly to the principal as
it increases the agent’s rents when the agent’s liability
for a poor performance is limited.4 Thus, second-best
contracts make trade-offs between the agent’s effort
and rents in the model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. The following section develops a principal-
agent model in which the principal motivates the
agent to expend effort on the basis of an accounting
performance measure. Section 3 describes the main
result: The more conservative the accounting earn-
ings measurements, the higher is the agent’s effort
under second-best contracts. A brief summary in §4
concludes the paper.
For expository purposes, proofs are provided in the
appendix.
3 Second-best contracts trade off agency costs of type (1) against
agency costs of type (2), and thus the two types of agency costs
inextricably interact. In the literature, the relation between account-
ing conservatism and agency costs of type (1) has been investigated
under the simplifying assumption that the agent’s effort level has
already been ﬁxed exogenously, and thus the effects of accounting
conservatism on agency costs of type (2) are ignored. For tractabil-
ity, this study adopts the simplifying assumption of risk neutrality.
Since the issue of suboptimal risk sharing does not arise with risk
neutrality, the interactions between agency costs of types (1) and (2)
are reduced but not eliminated.
4 In addition to increasing the agent’s rents, the fee spread affects
the agent’s risk bearing as well. The larger the spread between the
agent’s fees for favorable and unfavorable performances, the higher
is the risk that is imposed on the agent. Thus, if the agent is risk
averse, the principal must trade off the beneﬁts of greater effort
against the three related but distinct costs: (1) the agent’s disutility
of effort; (2) the agent’s rents; and (3) the risk premium that the
agent requires for additional risk bearing.
2. The Economic Setting
2.1. The Model
Consider a principal-agent setting in which the prin-
cipal delegates to the agent the decision for a pro-
ductive action and the action is personally costly to
the agent. Let e ∈A= e 0< e < 1 denote the agent’s
choice of action, where e is interpreted as his level
of effort. Agency income (gross of the agent’s fee) is
binary: x = x1 (low) or x2 (high). Given the agent’s
effort e, the probability of high income x2 being real-
ized is px2  e	 = e, and low income x1 is realized
with a probability of px1 e	= 1− e. Thus the agent’s
effort is productive in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochas-
tic dominance.
Let G and H represent the respective utility func-
tions of the principal and the agent. Assume that
G= x− sm	 and H = sm	−ve	, where v′e	 > 0 and
v′′e	 > 0. Here, sm	 denotes the agent’s compensa-
tion based on accounting performance measure m.5
ve	 represents the agent’s disutility of effort. Since
the agent is risk neutral in the model, compensation
for his risk bearing is not required. Thus the analy-
sis focuses on the effect of conservative accounting on
the trade-offs between the agent’s effort and rents.
The principal motivates the agent to expend effort
using accounting performance measure m=m1 (“low
income”) or m2 (“high income”). Given the setting
of binary income levels, an accounting measurement
system may be characterized by two conditional prob-
abilities  = pm1 x1	 and  = pm2 x2	. Throughout
the paper, accounting reports are assumed to be infor-
mative:  +  > 1 but imperfect:  +  < 2. In the
model, accounting report m2 is good news and m1 bad
news (Milgrom 1981).
The principal designs the agent’s compensation
schedule that is least costly and yet motivates the
agent to expend her desired level of effort. More
speciﬁcally, letting si = smi	 for i= 1 and 2, the prin-
cipal’s problem can be described as follows.
The Principal’s Contract Design Problem.
max
s1 s2 e
EG= 1− e	x1−s1− 1−	s2
+ ex2− 1−	s1−s2 (1)
subject to EH = 1− e	+ e1−	s1
+ 1− e	1−	+ es2
− ve	≥  (2)
5 In this study, actual outcomes are not publicly observable (or more
precisely not contractible), and thus the principal motivates the
agent to expend effort using an accounting performance measure.
As a result, the principal’s cost of hiring and motivating the agent
critically depends on the informational characteristics of accounting
reports, as in Gigler and Hemmer (2001) and Kwon et al. (2001).
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
e
EH = +− 1	−s1+ s2	
− v′e	= 0 (3)
s1 ≥−L (4)
where  represents the agent’s reservation utility for
contract acceptance. Constraint (3) is the (ﬁrst-order)
condition that the principal’s desired implementation
plan e is compatible with the agent’s effort incentive.6
Constraint (4) implies that the principal’s ability to
penalize the agent for a poor performance is limited.7
Denote by e∗ the ﬁrst-best effort level that maximizes
social welfare, i.e.,
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
1− e	x1+ ex2− ve	
Assuming that v′0	 < x2 − x1 < v′1	, one can show
that ﬁrst-best effort e∗ is unique and characterized by
the ﬁrst-order condition: x2− x1 = v′e∗	. To make the
analysis interesting, we impose the additional condi-
tion that the agent’s liability limit L is restricted:8
L<−− ve∗	+
(
1−
+− 1 + e
∗
)
v′e∗	 (5)
Given condition (5), it is not optimal for the princi-
pal to implement ﬁrst-best effort e∗ as the marginal
beneﬁt of effort is lower than its marginal cost of the
agent’s rents.
2.2. Accounting Conservatism
This study views a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial reporting as a
mapping from disaggregated detailed data to aggre-
gated accounting signals of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial state-
ments.9 Assume that, upon realization of actual
income x, a summary statistic or aggregated account-
ing signal y is generated as follows:
y = x+  (6)
6 Since v′′·	 > 0, the second-order condition for constraint (3) is
satisﬁed.
7 In the absence of a limited liability constraint, a ﬁxed-rent scheme
of the form s = x−k fully aligns the incentive of the agent with that
of the principal. Harris and Raviv (1979) suggest that limited lia-
bility is a convenient assumption in obtaining useful insight under
risk neutrality.
8 If liability limit L is sufﬁciently large, the principal’s contract-
ing problem (1)–(4) has the solution: s1 =  + ve∗	− 1− 	/+
−1	+e∗v′e∗	 and s2 = +ve∗	− −/+−1	+e∗v′e∗	. This
fee schedule motivates the agent to implement ﬁrst-best effort e∗,
and yet does not allow the agent’s rents. However, as will be shown
later, the principal must trade off between the agent’s effort and
rents when liability limit L is not large in the sense of (5).
9 Accounting may be viewed as consisting of two processes:
(1) aggregating underlying detailed data into “summary statistics”
and (2) mapping summary statistics into accounting reports. This
study focuses on the latter process. See Feltham (1977) for an inves-
tigation of the former process of aggregating accounting data into
summary statistics.
where x and  are independently distributed. Here,
signal y represents a statistic that summarizes disag-
gregated detailed accounting data from which ﬁnan-
cial reports m are to be generated. In particular,
assume that accounting noise  is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance 2.
Denote by f y x	 and F y x	 the probability density
and distribution functions of summary statistic y con-
ditional on true earnings x, respectively. As one can
easily show, the probability density function f y x	
has the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
f y x2	
f y x1	
<
f z x2	
f z x1	
(7)
for all y < z.
The accounting information system  that the
principal designs is characterized by a reporting
threshold w such that a high income report of m2 is
issued if summary statistic y is above threshold w,
and a low income report of m1 is given otherwise;
that is, = w	 and = w	, where10


w	=
∫ w
−

f y x1	 dy = F w x1	
w	=
∫ +

w
f y x2	 dy = 1− F w x2	
(8)
To deﬁne accounting conservatism, consider ac-
counting system %0 with a threshold level of w0 =
x1+x2	/2; thus, the system reports m1 or m2, depend-
ing on whether accounting evidence y is smaller or
larger than threshold w0. Because the probability den-
sity of  is symmetric around = 0, accounting system
%0 is neutral or unbiased in the sense that a low income
of m1 is reported when evidence y is more consistent
with true income being x1 than x2. Similarly, account-
ing report m2 is issued when statistic y is more likely
to obtain at state x2 than at state x1 (see Figure 1).
Accounting conservatism is deﬁned in terms of the
position of the accounting system’s reporting thresh-
old w relative to neutral threshold w0 = x1+ x2	/2.
Deﬁnition 1. An accounting information system
w	w	 is said to be conservative if w>w0; neutral
if w=w0; and liberal if w<w0. Given two accounting
information systems %1 = w1	w1	 and %2 =
w2	w2	, system %2 is said to be more conserva-
tive than system %1 if w2 >w1.
Thus, if the principal chooses w0 as the report-
ing threshold, the probability of issuing a correct
accounting report conditional on actual income is the
same for both income levels of x1 and x2. On the
10 Given the MLRP of f y x	 in (7), the Neyman-Pearson lemma
ensures that a thresholdbased reporting system w	w	 in (8)
is efﬁcient in the sense that, given a probability of type 1 error, the
reporting system minimizes the probability of type 2 error.
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Figure 1 Probability Densities of Evidence y
f (y |x1) f (y |x2)
x1 w0=(x1+x2)/2 w x2
other hand, if the principal chooses a higher threshold
level: w>w0, then w	 > w	. Thus, a conservative
accounting system is more likely to be correct given
an unfavorable outcome x= x1	, but only at the cost
of being more likely to be incorrect when a favorable
outcome x= x2	 is realized.
Given accountants’ preference for conservative
accounting, one may wonder whether conservatism
enhances the quality or informativeness of account-
ing reports. In this regard, it is noted that, given two
accounting systems %1 = 11 and %2 = 22,
accounting signals from system %2 are weakly more
informative than those from system %1 in the sense
of Blackwell (1953) if, and only if, the following two
inequalities hold:
2
1−2
≥ 1
1−1
and
2
1−2
≥ 1
1−1

Lemma 1 describes the relation between accounting
conservatism and ﬁnancial statement quality.
Lemma 1. Consider two accounting information sys-
tems %1 = 1 = w1	1 = w1	 and %2 = 2 =
w2	2 = w2	 with respective reporting thresh-
olds w1 and w2. If system %2 is more conservative than sys-
tem %1 (i.e., w2 >w1), then the following inequalities hold:
2
1−2
<
1
1−1
and
2
1−2
>
1
1−1
 (9)
Thus accounting conservatism neither increases nor
decreases the information content of accounting reports.
Proof. See the appendix.
3. Analysis
This section examines the main question: What is the
effect of conservative accounting on the agent’s effort
choice. To address the question, it is convenient to
rewrite the principal’s contract design problem (1)–(4)
in the following form:
max
s1e
EG= 1−e	x1+ex2−s1
−
[
1−
+−1+e
]
v′e	 (10)
subject to s1≥+ve	−
[
1−
+−1+e
]
v′e	 (11)
s1≥−L (12)
Denote by e¯ the level of the agent’s effort at which
two constraints (11) and (12) are equivalent:11
+ ve¯	−
[
1−
+− 1 + e¯
]
v′e¯	=−L (13)
Note that e¯ < e∗ (cf. (5)).
Consider the principal’s contract design problem
(10)–(12) for e < e¯. Because constraint (12) is redun-
dant, the optimal fee schedule of the agent has
the form


s1 = + ve	−
[
1−
+− 1 + e
]
v′e	
s2 = + ve	−
[ −
+− 1 + e
]
v′e	
As a result, the principal’s expected utility EG =
1− e	x1 + ex2 − ve	−  is strictly increasing in e for
all e < e¯, and the effort that the principal implements
is greater than or equal to e¯.
Therefore we turn to the case where the principal
implements e ≥ e¯. Maximizing EG in (10) subject to
constraint (12) yields s1 = −L and s2 = −L + v′e	/
+−1	. As a result, the respective expected utilities
of the principal and the agent have the forms


EG= 1−e	x1+ex2+L−
[
1−
+−1+e
]
v′e	
EH=−L+
[
1−
+−1+e
]
v′e	−ve	
(14)
Proposition 1 characterizes the effect of accounting
characteristics  on second-best contracts.
Proposition 1. Assume that the agent’s liability
limit L is restricted
L<−− ve∗	+
(
1−
+− 1 + e
∗
)
v′e∗	 (15)
Then, the solution of the principal’s contract design prob-
lem (1)–(4) has the form


e∗∗ = eˆ
s∗∗1 =−L
s∗∗2 =−L+
v′eˆ	
+− 1 
(16)
Here, the agent’s effort eˆ has the property
eˆ ∈ argmax
e¯≤e≤e∗
{
x2− x1	e−
[
1−
+− 1 + e
]
v′e	
}
 (17)
11 If Equation (13) has no solution in the set of possible efforts
A= e 0< e < 1, then constraint (11) is redundant.
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where e¯ is the unique root of the equation12
+L+ ve¯	−
[
1−
+− 1 + e¯
]
v′e¯	= 0 (18)
In particular, the respective expected utilities of the princi-
pal and the agent can be expressed as


EG∗∗=x1+ eˆx2−x1	+L−
[
1−
+−1+ eˆ
]
v′eˆ	
EH∗∗=−L+
[
1−
+−1+ eˆ
]
v′eˆ	−veˆ	
(19)
Proof. See the appendix.
Three observations are made regarding the
results in Proposition 1. First, note that eˆ > e¯, and thus
EH ∗∗ > . As a result, the principal allows the agent to
obtain rents under second-best contract (16). In par-
ticular, the magnitude of the agent’s rents,
EH∗∗ − =−−L+
[
1−
+− 1 + eˆ
]
v′eˆ	− veˆ	 (20)
is strictly increasing in eˆ. To induce the agent to
expend greater efforts, the principal must allow the
agent to obtain higher rents. Thus, the principal must
trade off the beneﬁt of increased effort not only
against the agent’s disutility of effort but also against
the agent’s increased rents.
Second, observe from (3) that the greater the agent’s
effort, the larger is the spread between the agent’s low
and high salaries. Speciﬁcally, the spread between the
agent’s high and low fees has the form
s∗∗2 − s∗∗1 =
v′eˆ	
w	+w	− 1 (21)
which is strictly increasing in eˆ. Thus, to motivate
the agent to increase his effort, the principal must
impose additional risk on the agent’s fee structure.
Given the assumption that the agent is risk neutral
in the model, increasing the agent’s risk bearing has
no effects on the principal’s welfare. However, when
the agent is risk averse, the principal must take into
account the risk premium that the agent requires for
increased risk bearing. Finally, observe that the right-
hand side (RHS) of (21) is strictly increasing in w
for all w ≥ w0, which implies that, as the accounting
system’s reporting threshold w increases beyond the
neutral level of w0, the agent’s risk bearing strictly
increases.
Proposition 2 describes the effect of conservative
accounting on second-best efforts.
12 If the left-hand side of (18) is negative in A= e 0< e < 1, then
set e¯= 0.
Proposition 2. Consider the situation in which (1) the
agent’s liability bound is limited in the sense that
L<−− ve∗	+
(
1−
+− 1 + e
∗
)
v′e∗	
and (2) second-best effort in (17) is an interior point, and
thus characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
x2− x1 = v′eˆ	+
[
1−
+− 1 + eˆ
]
v′′eˆ	
Then, the principal becomes strictly better off with conser-
vative accounting than with neutral or liberal accounting.
In particular, second-best efforts increase with accounting
conservatism.
Proof. See the appendix.
The results in Proposition 2 can be interpreted as
follows. First, note from Proposition 1 that second-
best contracts require the principal to trade off
between the agent’s effort and rents. More speciﬁ-
cally, decompose the principal’s expected utility into
the form
EG∗∗ = 1− eˆ	x1+ eˆx2− veˆ	− − EH∗∗ − 
Assuming an interior solution, one can differentiate
EG∗∗ and obtain the ﬁrst-order condition for a second-
best effort eˆ as follows:
x2− x1	− v′eˆ	 =

eˆ
EH∗∗ − 
=
[
1−
+− 1 + eˆ
]
v′′eˆ	 (22)
Thus the principal trades off the marginal beneﬁts
of effort (net of the agent’s marginal disutility of
effort) against the agent’s marginal rents. Note that
the agent’s marginal rents decrease with accounting
conservatism, i.e., the RHS of (22) strictly decreases
with accounting conservatism[
1−
+− 1 + eˆ
]
v′′eˆ	
=
[
1
/1−	− 1 + eˆ
]
v′′eˆ	 ↓ as w ↑ 
As a result, second-best effort eˆ increases with
accounting conservatism.
Also, it is interesting to note that the principal’s
expected costs of compensating the agent can be writ-
ten in the form
Es∗∗ = −L+ pm2 x2	s∗∗2 − s∗∗1 
= −L+
[
1
/1−	− 1 + eˆ
]
v′′eˆ	 (23)
As the accounting system’s reporting threshold w
increases in w ≥ w0, the probability of getting a
Kwon: Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Incentives
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favorable report given a favorable outcome, pm2 x2	,
decreases. However, it follows from (21) that the
agent’s fee spread s∗∗2 − s∗∗1  increases in w for w≥w0.
Consequently, it is unclear as to whether the agent’s
expected compensation Es∗∗ increases or decreases
as the reporting threshold w increases. As the last
expression in (23) shows, however, the decrease in
pm2 x2	 dominates the increase in s∗∗2 − s∗∗1 . Thus the
principal’s expected costs of compensating the agent
strictly decreases with accounting conservatism.
Focusing on the principal’s trade-off between the
agent’s effort and rents in a risk-neutral setting, the
analysis thus far has shown that accounting conser-
vatism enhances agency welfare by increasing the
agent’s equilibrium effort. However, when the agent
is risk averse, it is unclear whether accounting con-
servatism is still desirable. Note from (21), that as
reporting threshold w increases, a second-best con-
tract imposes increased risk on the agent for all
w ≥w0, and the principal’s cost of compensating the
agent for increased risk bearing may outweigh the
beneﬁt of greater effort.13
4. Conclusion
This study has examined the question of whether
accounting conservatism enhances the incentive value
of accounting signals and, if so, why. The analysis
has focused on the effect of conservative accounting
on the agency costs of the agent’s suboptimal effort
choice under moral hazard.
The main results are as follows. First, second-best
contracts require that the principal trades off the ben-
eﬁts of effort not only against the agent’s disutil-
ity of effort, but also against the agent’s rents. Next,
the second-best efforts that the principal motivates
the agent to put forth increase as accounting reports
become more conservative.
Kwon et al. (2001) have shown that conservative
accounting reduces agency costs of type (1). In combi-
nation with this result, the analysis of this study sug-
gests that accounting conservatism reduces agency
costs of both types (1) and (2). However, when the
agent is risk averse, the principal must trade off the
beneﬁt of greater effort against three distinct types
of costs to the principal: (1) the agent’s disutility of
effort; (2) the agent’s rents; and (3) the costs of sub-
optimal risk sharing. Thus, analyzing the effect of
accounting conservatism on the agent’s effort choice
gets considerably more complicated. In particular, the
13 For an example, assume: G= x− sm	; H =√sm	− e2/2; x = 10
or 12 with the respective probabilities of 1 − e and e; L =  = 0;
and  2 = 1. One can then show that EG∗∗ = 1060 for w = 105;
EG∗∗ = 1076 for w = 110; EG∗∗ = 1079 for w = 115; and EG∗∗ =
1072 for w = 120. Thus, while conservative accounting enhances
agency welfare, extreme conservatism is socially undesirable.
risk premium required for the agent’s risk bearing
may render extreme conservatism undesirable from
the perspectives of agency welfare.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Using (8), one can write
w	
1−w	 =
F w x1	
F w x2	

Differentiating this expression with respect to w, one
can show
d
dw
[
w	
1−w	
]
< 0 if, and only if
f w x2	
f w x1	
>
F w x2	
F w x1	
 (A.1)
On the other hand, the MLRP in (7) implies
f y x2	 <
f w x2	
f w x1	
f y x1	
for all y < w. Integrating this inequality with respect to y
for y <w then yields
F w x2	 <
f w x2	
f w x1	
F w x1	 (A.2)
Combining (A.1) and (A.2), one can conclude that the frac-
tion w	/1−w	 is strictly decreasing in w. The fact that
the fraction w	/1− w	 is strictly increasing in w can
be shown in a similar fashion. This completes the Proof of
Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. As shown in the text, one may
assume that e≥ e¯. Given e, maximizing (10) subject to con-
straint (12) yields 

s1 =−L
s2 =−L+
v′e	
+− 1 
Because the principal’s expected utility has the form
EG= 1− e	x1+ ex2+L−
[
1−
+− 1 + e
]
v′e	
under this fee schedule, second-best effort must have prop-
erty (17). The Proof of Proposition 1 is thus completed. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The ﬁrst-order condition
for eˆ is
x2− x1 = v′eˆ	+
[
1−w	
w	+w	− 1 + eˆ
]
v′′eˆ	 (A.3)
Note that the RHS of (A.3) is shifted downward as reporting
threshold w increases. Thus, as accounting measurements
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become more conservative, second-best effort eˆ increases.
Given second-best contract (16), the principal’s expected
utility can be written as
EG∗∗ = x1+ eˆx2− x1	+L−
[
1−
+− 1 + eˆ
]
v′eˆ	
= x1+ eˆx2− x1	+L−
[
1
/1−	− 1 + eˆ
]
v′eˆ	
Thus it follows from the envelope theorem that the principal
becomes better off as the fraction /1− 	 increases with
conservative accounting (cf. (9)). This completes the Proof
of Proposition 2. 
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